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Abstract 
 
In Hong Kong the traditional system of multiple ownership in multi-storey buildings 
is undivided form of co-ownership based on the common law principle of tenancy in 
common. A legal instrument known as the deed of mutual covenant (DMC) binds the 
developer, the first purchasers and their successors in title on the matters of division 
of shares, obligations and limitations to the parties. 
 
The undivided co-ownership system is however facing growing criticism for the 
associated problems of building management ranging form a deadly blazes dated back 
in a decade ago that sounded the alarm on fire safety to the present day concern of 
falling windows and facades as well as rampant unauthorized building works (UBW) 
claiming lives and causing injuries. 
 
Literature explaining the causes of poor building management points to the current 
institutional setting for having incubated a poor social norm of free riding and lack of 
prescribed formation of central self-governing authority rendering transaction costs 
too high for pure private bargaining among owners to work. It is widely agreed that a 
statutory strata title system such as Commonhold in the UK will facilitate coordinated 
decision making and thus all together eradicate the free rider problems and address 
the need for contemporary building management. 
 
Employing Oakerson’s (1992) basic framework for institutional analysis of common 
pool resource situation and Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) three-level decision making 
 iii
analysis, this study demonstrates that the Commonhold institution, as most scholars 
anticipate’ is structurally and elementally sound and a high degree of consistency 
throughout the hierarchical structure of decision making is maintained. Nonetheless, it 
also reveals the systemic imperfection that constitutional or collective choice out of 
good intention can result in hindrance in decision making in lower levels. This 
accentuates the importance of sensible judgment and balance of outcomes as a 
complement, which is something not explicitly given consideration by certain 
advocators of the scheme. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In Hong Kong undivided co-ownership has been the traditional system of multiple 
ownership in multi-storey buildings. The undivided form of co-ownership is based on 
tenancy in common, a common law principle of concurrent ownership under which all 
unit owners are entitled to undivided shares of the development as co-owners, with 
the right of exclusive use of their units. A legal instrument known as the deed of 
mutual covenant (DMC) binds the developer, the first purchasers and their successors 
in title on the matters of division of shares, obligations and limitations to the parties. 
(Sihombing and Wilkinson, 1994) 
 
The undivided co-ownership system is however facing growing criticism for the 
associated problems, especially those in the realm of building management. From 
aesthetics to safety, signs of inadequacy emerge in times, indicating that the 
traditional system of multiple ownership can no longer provide an institutional setting 
that facilitates the management of multi-storey buildings. From the deadly blazes 
dated back in a decade ago that sounded the alarm on fire safety (Walters and 
Hastings, 1998) to the present day concern of falling windows and facades as well as 
rampant unauthorized building works (UBW) claiming lives and causing injuries (Yiu, 
et el., 2004), new problems concerning the physical state and safety of buildings arise 
while the old ones remains unsolved. Managerial arrangements suffer as well 
considering the ambiguous requirements on owners’ consent and conflicts between 
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owners and management bodies. Considering that quite a number of scholars have put 
the blame of poor building management on the current institutional setting (Walters 
and Hastings, 1998; Walters and Kent, 2000), it is not unreasonable to describe the 
undivided co-ownership system as more like a hindrance to proper building 
management. 
 
The decision of adapting the undivided co-ownership system in Hong Kong, a 
substantial divergence from the legal tradition of it metropolitan state, UK, was 
greatly influenced by the situations in the 1950s, including the choice of leasehold 
tenure and the boom in multi-storey development. Technical issues like the lack of 
strata surveying system also contribute to the rejection of other from of co-ownership 
like the condominium title. Nevertheless, the aforementioned telltale signs have been 
giving constant reminders that what might have been a sound and convenient 
expediency as ‘an immediate legal solution to protect purchasers within the existing 
deed system’ (Sihombing and Wilkinson, 1994) can just barely survive in an era of 
full exploitation of development potential when redevelopment taking place before 
the end of the physical life of buildings is unlikely. 
 
Literature has provided an explanation for these outcomes of poor building 
management. Walters and Kent (2000) point out that the current institutional setting 
has incubated a poor social norm of free riding, leading to great difficulty in collective 
maintenance actions. Transaction costs have surged to too higher a level for pure 
private bargaining among owners to work. Instead of decentralized collective actions, 
the free rider problem and high cost of transaction call for a change in the institutional 
setting into a statutory strata title system. Walters and Kent (2000) specifically 
referred to the institution of Commonhold in the UK, most probably due to the 
 3
resemblance in institutional background. It is argued that in Commonhold the 
prescribed establishment of a self-governing commomhold association will facilitate 
coordinated decision making and thus all together eradicate the free rider problems 
and address the need for contemporary building management. 
 
The named Commonhold Bill was defected at the time of Walters and Kent’s (2000) 
work. The matter of Commonhold legislation was revised and the Commonhold and 
Leasehold Reform Act was enacted in the year of 2002, making Commonhold the 
latest addition to land (and multi-storey buildings) co-ownership system of the UK. 
Over the last five years, the Act has undergone a series of consultation and 
amendment. If the institution of commonhold ideally turns out to be what Walters an 
Kent (2000) anticipated, it would be indeed an invaluable example of how new 
system of strata title is implemented in society in which traditional co-ownership 
systems prevails, despite to certain extent the difference in institutional setting 
between Hong Kong and UK. For this reason it is high time the effectiveness of 
Commonhold in facilitating owners’ decision making was reviewed. 
 
Inspired by Walters and Kent’s (2002) approach in examining the non-statutory 
co-ownership system in Hong Kong with Oakerson’s (1992) basic framework for 
institutional analysis of common pool resource situation, this study employs the same 
in investigating the British Commonhold institution. It is aimed to examine if the 
institution of Commonhold as an alternative to non-statutory common law 
co-ownership is as ideal as numerous scholars suggest. 
 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this study is to examine whether the institution of Commonhold is sound 
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enough to make an ideal alternative to non-statutory system of co-ownership. A 
number of objects are set up to facilitate achievement of the aim. 
 
1. To review the identified problems leading to poor management prevailing in 
non-statutory systems and find out whether they appear in the Commonhold 
institution 
2. To review Kiser and Ostrom’ s (1982) three-level institutional analysis and 
identify the necessary elements within the different levels of decision making 
3. To evaluate the decision making arrangements of the institution of Commonhold 
employing Kiser and Ostrom’ s (1982) three-level institutional analysis and 
related findings 
 
1.3 Scope 
In this study the scope of the institutional analysis is limited to the decision making 
arrangements of the institution of Commonhold only. Justifications for this will be in 
the discussion of the analytical model in Chapter 2. 
 
This study is not, and is not intended to be an explanation of every section of 
Commonhold related law. Only legislations related to the identified preconditions will 
be given detailed examination. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This is a qualitative research which relies very much on information from relevant 
legislation, government publication and journals review. Literature identifying 
problems leading to poor management prevailing in non-statutory systems and 
concerning policy reforms in the management of common recourses will be 
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examined. 
 
Following the logic of Walters and Kent (2000), the institutional analysis of the 
Commonhold institution is based on Oakerson’s (1992) framework and Kiser and 
Ostrom’ s (1982) three-level institutional analysis of decision making rules. Through 
segregation of decision making rules into separate levels, the analytical framework 
reveals effectiveness of different aspects of the rules within each level and more 
phenomenally, the relationships or conflicts occurring between the three levels in the 
hierarchy. 
 
1.5 Structure 
The following part of the study is divided into five chapters. Chapter two covers a 
literature review of institutional theories including the analytical models employed in 
this study. Chapter three gives an overview of the Hong Kong example demonstrating 
the identified prime causes of poor building management commonly found in 
non-statutory ownership systems. Chapter four comprises an institutional analysis of 
the institution of Commonhold. This involves mainly segregation of decision making 
rules into separate levels. Implications of the revealed effectiveness of different 
aspects of the rules within each decision making level and more significantly, the 
relationships in the hierarchy will be covered in Chapter four. The final chapter draws 
attention to certain limitation of this study as it gives concludes this research. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of institutional arrangement 
 
2.1 Definition 
Institution in society may be defined as the set of laws, customs and societal norms 
that determine property rights, which in turn define the range of privileges granted to 
individuals with specific assets (Eggertsson, 1996). 
 
Pejovich (1995) defines institutions as the legal, administrative and customary 
arrangements for repeated human interactions. In society the institutional framework 
comprise both formal and informal rules. While the law, including any constitutional 
law, legislation and regulations promulgated thereunder as well as officially declared 
rules make up the formal rules, informal rules often have their origins in experiences, 
traditional values and religious believes. In formal rules are part of the cultural 
heritage and its transmission from one generation to another usually relies on teaching 
and imitation. Depending on their origins, informal rules may complement or run 
against the spirit of the formal ones 
 
2.2 Oakerson’s framework 
Oakerson’s (1986, 1992) framework, expanded by Edwards and Steins (1998), is an 
analytical tool for the examination of common-pool resource situations. It identifies 
two separate input factors, the physical attributes of the resource and technological 
aids as a complement to resource constraints as well as the decision-making 
arrangement governing the use of the resource. The two factors have their effect on 
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the patterns of interaction among decision makers and users, resulting in the outcome. 
The heavy influence of physical attributes on the outcome is reflected by an addition 
line of causation from the physical component. 
 
 
Source: Oakerson (1992) 
Figure 1. Oakerson’s basic framework 
 
1. Physical attributes of the resource and technological aids as a complement to 
resource constraints 
 
Attributes and particularly the constraints of physical assets are the root of the 
problems regarding commons of all types and uses (Edwards and Steins, 1998). 
Scholars in pursuit of understanding of the relationship between physical properties of 
commons and their sustainability have come up with the following concept of 
resource governance: 
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i ). ‘Substractability’ (or ‘jointness of consumption’), which refers to the extent 
to which users are capable of subtracting from the enjoyment of other 
users;1 
ii ). ‘Excludability’, which refers to the extent to which access of the potential 
users can be controlled;2 
iii ). ‘Divisibility’, which refers to the extent to which the resource can be 
divided amongst the users for management purpose.3 
 
Technological aids are given consideration in acknowledgement of possible, if limited 
control over inadequacies of the physical assets. 
 
2. Decision-making arrangements governing the use of the resource 
Decision-making arrangements, or regime, exist as sets of formal and informal rules 
governing appropriation of the resource. Decision-making arrangements serve to 
stipulate and regulate access and resource allocation and, in the event of failure to 
observe, provide for sanctions. 
 
Recognizing that decision rules exist in levels and form in sequence, Edwards and 
Steins (1998) employ the three levels of analysis devised by Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
in order to facilitate an understanding of institutional evolution and the progression of 
institutional change through different levels of the institutional arrangement (Edwards 
and Steins, 1998). The three-level institutional analysis is to be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters. 
 
                                                 
1 Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
2 Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
3 Oakerson (1992), Tang (1992) 
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In reality in most developed cities with a burning need for building management, it is 
difficult if not impossible to imagine the physical nature of the asset, which is often 
characterized densely populated high-rise buildings in competing use, would 
experience dramatic changes. Only the decision-making process attached to the use of 
the asset can be altered (Walters and Kent, 2000). This forms the basis of seeking 
redress of ill building management in institutional design and justifies the focus on 
decision making arrangements in this research. 
 
2.3 The three-level decision making rules analysis 
Despite the lack of in-depth presentation in their research paper, Walters and Kent 
(2000) suggest examining the decision making arrangements of building management 
in Hong Kong with Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) three-level institutional analysis and 
the elaboration of Edwards and Steins (1998). Through segregation of decision 
making rules into separate levels, the analytical framework reveals effectiveness of 
different aspects of the rules within each level and more phenomenally, the 
relationships or conflicts occurring between the three levels in the hierarchy. This 
would ultimately facilitate an understanding of institutional evolution and the 
progression of institutional change through different levels of the institutional 
arrangement. 
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Source: Ostrom (1990) 
Figure. 2 Linkages among rules and levels of analysis 
 
The three levels of decision making rules affecting individual behaviour in collective 
choice as to common pool resources governance are: 
 
i ). the constitutional level, which considers decision making arrangements external 
to the local community; 
ii ). the collective choice level, which considers interaction between the collective 
decision makers. The rules which affect behaviour and decisions taken at this 
level are derived from the constitutional level; 
iii ). the operational level, which considers interaction between resource users. The 
rules which affect behaviour at this level are derived from the collective choice 
level.4 
 
Constitutional level is the top in the hierarchy while the operational level is the lowest. 
Constitutional rules prerequisite to all are formed first, then the collective choice rules 
within the setting of the constitutional rules and finally the operational rules subject to 
the previous two. 
                                                 
4 Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
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Source: Ostrom (1990) 
Figure 3. Generic rule configuration in multiple-use common pool resources 
 
There is no clear answer as to what decision rules should appear in the three decision 
levels. Definitions of the rules of decision making identified in different scholars’ 
work were found to be simply varied (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom 1990; Tang, 
1992). The following definitions of the three level rules are digest of different 
scholars’ views. 
 
2.3.1 Constitutional level 
Rules of constitutional level are the top level rules governing rules of future collective 
decisions. On the matter of constraining future collective choices, constitutional 
decisions live on beyond the initial period. They form the basis of modification of 
collective rules as individuals react to the consequence of collective decision and 
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demand improvement (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). 
 
Constitutional decision making in Oakerson’s (1992) categories of rules is part of the 
broader classification of external arrangements. In his understanding, constitutional 
rules cover not only eligibility of participation in decision making but also external 
decision makers’ legislation and enforcement of lower level rules. Similar ideas 
appear in the research of Edwards and Steins (1998). 
 
While the more common operational rules low in the hierarchy are easily recognized 
and conceptualized, literatures that emerged during early development of common 
pool resources governance are inadequate in identifying clear criteria of rules of the 
constitutional level. Indeed, there is much confusion concerning what exactly 
comprise the higher level rules (Wang, 2002). In view of the ambiguity, Wang (2002) 
attempts to ‘decode underlying constitutional and collective choice rules based on the 
interpretation of operational rule. (Wang, 2002)’ His definition of constitutional 
prerequisites is as follows: 
 
1. Individual rights must be defined and protected. This is an inference from the 
polycentric governance theory Wang quotes, ‘The individual person is the doer 
of acts. The way each individual as a person relates himself to others is the basis 
of all social organization.’ Thus, ‘individuals form the basic unit in the design of 
all political institution’ (Ostrom, 1987). 
 
Wang goes on to explain, ‘Precisely for the reason of the importance of individual to 
society and theoretical analysis, definition and protection of individual rights is the 
first constitutional rule of the self-governance theory as well as the foundation of 
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other constitutional rules.’ 
 
2. Society should respect the self governance of individual citizens. ‘No single 
center of authority need dominate all of the rest. Smaller communities of interest 
can be organized on principles of self-government and maintain autonomy in the 
governance of their own internal affairs. Other interests that are shared by several 
different communities can be organized as autonomous self-governing 
authorities.’ (Ostrom, 1987) 
 
Accentuating the importance of autonomy, Wang believes it takes more than authority 
granted at the constitutional level to achieve self governance. Autonomy must be free 
from potential intrusion by other organization, especially the government branches so 
as to avoid outside interference and control. Thus, the constitutional principle must 
strictly carry out such proposition as ‘a body of men are unfit to be both judges and 
parties at the same time’ (Ostrom, 1987). 
 
3. The property rights must effectively exist both as a matter of law and a matter of 
fact. Summarizing the opinions of Wang and other scholars, two aspects of the 
property right issue must be considered. First, how the bundles of property rights 
are to be distributed among different appropriators in the system. For example, 
Edwards and Steins (1998) identify in their study of the New Forest the 
extractive use of logging and thus the private property right claimed over the 
felled trees by the logging parties as well as the right over the forest as a 
commons shared among everyone justifying the non-extractive use of leisure 
(Edwards and Steins, 1998). Second, how the property rights function in practice 
in contrast to those in legal stipulations. 
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4. The rule of law must exist. Wang differentiates the rule by law from the rule of 
law and stresses that the latter is elemental to enforcement covenants and 
contracts. ‘The Hobbesian assumption that “covenants, without the sword, are 
but words” is congruent with the American theory of constitutional decision 
making only when one adds “And the sword, without covenants, is but an 
instrument of tyranny”. Use of the sword is legitimate only when used in accord 
with the terms of a covenant to maintain reason and justice in the conduct of 
human affairs’ (Ostrom, 1987). Accordingly, a contract as an instrument to 
regulate and facilitate transaction is recognized. 
 
2.3.2 Collective choice level 
At the collective choice level, collective decisions are made by officials (including 
citizens acting as officials) to determine, enforce, continue, or alter actions authorized 
within institutional arrangements (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). Collect choice rules are 
essentially the basis of these decisions, which give rise to rules of the operational 
level and regulate individuals’ actions. 
 
Oakerson (1992) discusses the characteristics of what he calls ‘”common-property” 
arrangement’, rules and conditions under which a chosen group of appropriators 
managing commons for the benefit of all appropriators. These collective choice rules 
come into existence when individuals forsake their right to certain extent and 
participate in a process of collective choice that sets limits on individual use in return 
for protection of the total yield of the commons and individuals’ shares. The latter, 
however, is not always secured thanks to well-identified troubles of common pool 
resources management such as the free-rider problem. Oakerson also points out a 
 15
series of problems that management bodies are bound to encounter and settle. These 
may entail determination of proportion the community must agree before a course of 
action may be adopted, enforcement of decisions and disputes resolution (Oakerson, 
1992). By prescribing voting requirements and formally vesting the management 
bodies with power for enforcement and sanction a well-defined set of decision rules at 
collective choice level reduce costs of transactions, which will encourage users to 
include a social motive in their decision to improve the condition of the commons 
leading to increased total yield (Walters and Kent, 2000). Collective choice rules are 
thus indispensable should challenge of authority and disputes among participants and 
decision makers be avoided. 
 
Oakerson’s (1992)’entry’ and ‘exit’ rules regarding qualification for participation in a 
management body is further elaborated by Edwards and Steins (1998), who highlight 
the need for balance of power among collective choice decision makers and other user 
groups. Preponderance of certain majority user groups in the management body may 
suggests that some collective choice decision makers rated expediency over equity 
when devising further operational rights with their power. Examining the relative 
power among collective choice decision makers and other user groups would review 
the issue and help maintained an environment of trust for effective, unprejudiced 
collective choice decision making, especially in competing, multiple-use scenarios. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned set of constitutional rules, Wang (2002) also derives 
from literatures on the theory of polycentric governance certain preconditions at 
collective choice level, attaining which would contribute to positive outcomes and 
sustainable development of common pool resources (Wang, 2002). They are: 
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1. The existence of the common pool resources governance organization. Efficient 
transactions among the participants require them or their representatives to form 
a specified CPR governance organization which ‘must engage in adopting the 
rules of the collective decision making of self-governance as its function so as to 
accomplish the goal of CPR’s rational governance and sustainable development. 
Such organization might not include any organization acting either toward 
market or under government will’ (Wang, 2002). 
 
Within multiple ownership property, transactions between owners can either take 
place within an organizational setup such as a management co-operative or by private 
bargaining between the parties in a market situation (Walters and Kent, 2000). The 
existence of a governance organization for management of the common pool 
resources lessens reliance on the route of market bargaining, what Walters and Kent 
(2000) criticize as extremely costly and in essence unworkable due to the 
opportunistic nature of people and the free rider problem. 
 
It is inferred that by necessitating the existence of the common pool resources 
governance organization, Wang implies that such an organization should have 
specified scope rules setting out the duties and allowable actions of the organization, 
the positions within the management system to which the duties are attached, as well 
as membership rules dealing with entry and exit of the collective choice arena.  
 
2. The establishment and operation of sound election rules. ‘Because it is 
impossible for each individual CPR participant to be involved in collective 
decision-making process, a special selection mechanism must be up in 
determining who would act as representatives for the participants at large. For 
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this purpose, the ideal selection mechanism is a fair election and its rules. Such 
election rules should establish fair and reasonable election process, and allow the 
realization of each participant’s equal and legitimate voting rights and 
impeachment rights’ (Wang, 2002). 
 
3. The establishment and operation of sound decision making mechanisms. Because 
decision making covers a wide spectrum of details, Wang’s analysis suggests that 
a number of requirements fall within this category. A reliable decision-making 
mechanism must ensure that the representatives in the decision-making process 
fulfill their fiduciary responsibility of working in the best interest of the 
represented group. Their decisions ought to be free from influence of money, 
political power and racial discrimination. 
 
According to the self-governance theory, the polycentric governance is improved by 
continuous communications and learning among participants. Face-to-face meeting is 
described in various literatures (Ostrom 1990) as an ideal opportunity for exchange of 
otherwise unavailable information regarding the parties’ concerned aspects of the 
common assets and thus mutual understanding. Whilst sound decision making 
mechanisms facilitate decision making, it is the meetings for communication and 
decision, which should convene at reasonable rate, that initiate actions and agreement 
for management purpose. 
 
Sound decision-making mechanisms at the least must contain a set of negotiation 
rules among participants with equal status. Wang even goes as far to assert that the 
outcome of negotiation and consultation must come out of true compromise and 
accommodation, rather than majority versus minority voting, despite the letter being 
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an effective last resort in most situations in light of the difficulties to compromise. 
 
4. The establishment and operation of an effective and fair sanction system. In 
order to compel the users to abide by the rules for the protection of the total yield 
of the commons, an enforcement agency must be vested with the authority for 
enforcement and punishment. 
 
Besides what Wang defines, in reality it often requires consideration of conflicts 
arising when exercising the power of sanction, which very much determine the 
feasibility of sanction by autonomous self-governing authorities. A living proof is that 
as a matter of law in some private housing estates, the self-governing authority are 
given the power to temporary impound vehicles illegally parked on the privates road 
with wheel locks for a fine whereas as a matter of fact, impoundment never happens 
as the parties try to avoid confrontation and the effectiveness of sanction is nothing 
more than that of a sign of warning. In these cases intervention of external official 
authorities is expected, which is somewhat against the spirit of self-governance. 
 
5. The decision makers must have access to relevant information. Insufficient 
information is a common cause of incorrect decisions. Asymmetric information 
distribution would lead to irrational and incorrect rules, which bias against 
certain participants with relatively less information (Wang, 2002). Thus, as Wang 
quotes, ‘without access to reliable information about complex processes, 
participates may not understand the ambiguous situations they face’ (Ostrom, et 
al., 1994).5 
                                                 
5 Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J., (1994) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool, Resources Ann 
Arbor: The university of Michigan Press 
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2.3.3 Operational level 
The lowest level operational rules are of the closest relationship to daily life of 
common pool resources users, having immediate effects on their decision making 
behaviour. Rules at this level are indeed to a great extent diversified, with different 
commons having different sets of operational rules specific for the situation. 
 
Edwards and Steins (1998) explain that the operational rules exist to regulate 
individual behaviour in the interest of maintaining the resource system at a sustainable 
level, i.e. its ability to continuously produce an acceptable flow of extractive resource 
units, or in the case of service like a building provides, to support certain amount of 
resource system users over time. 
 
When devising operational rules one must also examine the patterns of use and 
resources subtraction from the system. Depending on the degree of the adverse effect, 
activities leading to depletion of the resources must be forbidden or limited in 
duration to prevent damage by cumulative use. Moreover, conflicts as a result of 
mutually exclusive use would necessitate segregation of use over time and area. 
 
Thus, Edwards and Steins’ (1998) set of operational rules governing multiple use 
commons comprise the followings: 
 
i ). Definition of users, such as a register of people entitled to access to the common 
and clarification of the details of different rights; 
ii ). Specification of what each of the categories of users can do, such as rules 
concerning the manner in which the common may be used; 
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iii ). Details of how the different rules will be enforced, such as who will adjudicate 
disputes and what resource they will have in attempting to remedy issues.6 
 
Wang (2002) contends that ‘the well-crafted seven rules, including position rules, 
boundary rules, authority rules, scope rules, aggregation rules, information rules, 
pay-off rules, are all rules at operational level. As argued, whenever those seven rules 
are met, the institutional arrangement of polycentric governance might have very 
positive result and achieve the sustainable development of CPR’ (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
The seven well-crafted rule Wang mentioned are the design principles Ostrom (1990) 
concluded from an empirical study of several robust, long-enduring common pool 
resources institutions. Each of these design principles is ‘an essential element or 
condition that helps to account for the success of those institutions in sustaining the 
common pool resources and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of 
appropriators to the rules in use. They affect incentives in such a way that 
appropriators will be willing to commit themselves to conform to operational rules 
devised in such systems, to monitor each other’s conformance, and to replicate the 
common pool resource institutions across generational boundaries’ (Ostrom, 1998). 
 
Design principles illustrated by long-enduring common pool resource institutions 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals or household who have rights to withdraw resource units from the 
common pool resources must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the 
common pool resources itself. 
 
                                                 
6 Edwards and Steins (1998) 
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2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and / or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labour, material and / or money. 
 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules. 
 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit common pool resources conditions and 
appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the 
appropriators. 
 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rule are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both. 
 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to 
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external governmental authorities. 
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For common pool resources that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
 
Source: Ostrom (1998) 
 
Despite Wang’s claim that the well-crafted rules are operational in nature, careful 
scrutiny of the design principles reveals that with the exceptions of (1) Clearly 
defined boundaries and (2) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules 
and local conditions, all rules belong to either constitutional or collective choice level 
and constitute to a significant part of the aforementioned preconditions at the 
respective levels by Wang. Accordingly, preconditions at operational level should 
encompass the followings: 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
 
Unsurprisingly, the list for operational decision making is much shorter than those for 
constitutional or collective choice level. This is a necessary consequence of varying 
conditions of different commons prohibiting more precise definition. Nonetheless, 
proper drafting, absence of contravention of upper level rules and participants’ 
understanding should always be key features of sound operational rules, as well as the 
constitutional and collective choice counterparts.
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Chapter 3 
Fundamental problems in non-statutory co-ownership 
system – the Hong Kong example 
 
3.1 Background of the co-ownership system in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong undivided co-ownership has been the traditional system of multiple 
ownership in multi-storey buildings. The undivided form of co-ownership is based on 
tenancy in common, a common law principle of concurrent ownership under which all 
unit owners are entitled to undivided shares of the development as co-owners, with 
the right of exclusive use of their units. A legal instrument known as the deed of 
mutual covenant (DMC) binds the developer, the first purchasers and their successors 
in title on the matters of division of shares, obligations and limitations to the parties. 
(Sihombing and Wilkinson, 1994) 
 
Governing this system of co-ownership are a series of statutory law, the most 
prominent of which is the Multistorey Buildings (Owners Incorporation) Ordinance 
first enacted in 1970 and later renamed as the Building Management Ordinance in 
1993. As the changing name suggests, this legislation has an expanding array of 
objectives in consequence of the government’s practice of incremental piecemeal 
legislation and amendment. One of the numerous alternations made to the Building 
Management Ordinance is to allow the government to intervene the contractual 
relationship of the developer, owners and managers by prescribing certain rules in the 
deed of mutual covenant. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the effort in refining the 
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Ordinance, owners’ incorporation is never made mandatory. 
 
3.2 The primary causes of problematic building management 
Adopting Oakerson’s (1986, 1992) basic framework of institutional analysis, Walters 
and Kent (2000) identify that the defects of the institution of common law 
co-ownership falls in two respects, the physical context and the decision making 
arrangement. 
 
The problems in physical context stem from the common ownership of a physical 
asset. Unlike multiple ownership by long leases in the UK which features a landlord 
figure with an economic interest in the asset for the self-enforcement of maintenance 
and repair obligations, the common law co-ownership system in Hong Kong lacks 
such central authority to prevent the unit owners from acting to maximize their 
individual utility. This results in one single problem manifesting itself in three 
different manners with various extent of consequence: 
 
1. Common parts and property suffer from over utilization, which is referred to as 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Walters and Kent point out that is no 
incentive for prevention of depletion in concerted effort, leading to each 
individual owner using as much of the common property as possible. The 
worst-case scenario is that common property is taken over by a particular owner 
for his own enjoyment. 
 
2. The whole building or development suffers owing to the interdependence 
characteristic of real estate. As Walters and Kent cite ‘the independent actions of 
nearby owners can have a dramatic effect on the value of a specific property’ 
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(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996). An owner choosing to use his unit to the 
maximum capacity in a situation without coordination can cause externalities to 
the detriment of the common interest within the whole building or development. 
 
3. The community suffers in terms of aesthetics and safety. This problem is an 
augmentation of the second. Buildings are not for the enjoyment of the owners 
only. They benefit the community by providing public goods which may take the 
forms of amenities, visual interest or building safety to passer-bys. Lacking 
coordination owners will act on their own and refuse to make contributions as 
such. 
 
Since the physical context, as Walters and Kent comment, can hardly experience any 
change of significant degree, they believe the solution should probably lies in the 
arrangement for co-owners’ decision making and recognition of the inadequacies in 
this aspect is a prerequisite. 
 
Walters and Kent asserted that the current co-ownership system entirely fails in 
facilitating coordination for building management. Transactions between owners are 
left to take place by private bargaining in a market situation, which is doomed to 
failure due to self-interested behaviours and opportunistic nature of people resulting 
in the free rider problem. Walters and Kent illustrate this with an example of 
refurbishment of the common entrance lobby in a multiple ownership high-rise block, 
first raised by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996). In spite of the fact that the collective 
rise in unit values exceeds the cost of the refurbishment, not even a single owner will 
be prepared to unilaterally pay for the refurbishment of the common entrance lobby 
simply because the cost exceeds the increase in value of any particular unit 
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attributable to the refurbishment. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) suggest that 
divergence between short run individual interest and the long run collective good as 
such is ascribable to three features: 
 
? Non-excludable – non of the owners can be excluded from the benefit of the 
refurbishment 
? Non-exhaustible – the benefit to each of the owners does not depend on the 
number of owners sharing the expense of the refurbishment work 
? No enforced participation – the example assumes no contractual legal or 
institutional mechanism has been introduced to enforce participation by all 
owners, which is, unfortunately, the current situation in Hong Kong. 
 
These features make a perfect hotbed for the poor social norm of free riding, 
rendering transaction cost too high for pure market bargaining to work. Instead of 
decentralized collective actions, the free rider problem and high cost of transaction 
call for coordination and enforcement by a centralized group such as formal 
organizations of incorporated owners. Alternation of the existing institutional rule can 
curtail transaction cost and redress the problem. 
 
The second problem emerges from the agency relationship between owners and their 
property agent, a common one in Hong Kong. Walters and Kent argue that the 
appropriate from of owner organization in a scenario involving only transaction costs 
between owners is radically different form one with an agency relation introduced. 
They described the agency relationship in building management as an atypical one 
considering that ‘the individual principal is weak in comparison to the agent who has 
delegated power from all owner principals. With the agent having greater power to 
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undertake decisions that diverge from the principals’ best interest, the residual loss of 
the principals’ utility will be higher than in a case where there is a single principal’ 
(Walters and Kent, 2000). It follows that high agency costs are incurred. To minimize 
the loss, the owners should set up an organizational structure to coordinate the 
decision making process and contract among themselves to form a small 
representative group for transacting with the agent and monitoring its actions. As 
Walters and Kent suggest, the current provisions of the Building Management 
Ordinance do not appear to address this particular problem. 
 
Despite the simplistic presentation, the three levels of analysis of the decision making 
rules in the current system of co-ownership conducted by Walters and Kent reveals 
that the decision making mechanism in most of the rarely-existing self-governing 
organization (e.g. incorporated owners) is sheer a mess, be it the sharpness of the 
decision making rules within the individual levels or the consistency of rules between 
different levels. Their example concerning rules to pass resolutions and the scope of 
sanctions and penalties available is merely a tip of an iceberg of confusion and 
uncertainty surrounding the decision making rules governing the management of 
multi-storey buildings. 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional analysis of Commonhold 
 
4.1 Criteria 
In this chapter the institutions of commonhold co-ownership are examined employing 
the three-level decision making analysis, with a slightly modified version of Wang’s 
(2002) three sets of preconditions for the respective decision levels, listed below, as 
criteria of judgment. 
 
Constitutional level 
1. Definition and protection of individual rights  
2. Autonomy of self-governance 
3. Definition and protection of Property rights 
4. Rule of law 
 
Collective choice level 
1. Existence of the common pool resources governance organization 
2. Sound representatives election rules 
3. Sound decision making mechanisms 
4. Sound dispute resolution and sanction system 
5. Decision makers having access to relevant information 
 
Operational level 
1. Definition of boundaries 
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2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
 
In spite of the fact that Wang’s preconditions are comprehensive summarization of 
wisdom of scholars on the subject, what might be unique to management of common 
area of building and not suit well in any of the factors are to be discussed under new, 
separate headings / sub-headings. It is hoped that such an arrangement would also 
help contribute to refinement of the three-level decision making analysis model. 
 
4.2 Background 
Commonhold is the latest addition to land (and multi-storey buildings) co-ownership 
system of the UK in the year of 2002 after long debate. It was first established to 
remedy the customary rule in the UK jurisdiction that the burden of a positive 
covenant does not run with the land, derived from the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750. The Commonhold scheme 
provides a satisfactory way of owning and managing properties which encompass 
communal facilities. As the UK government prognoses, ‘commonhold developments 
may comprise not merely housing estates and blocks of flats, but “even a complete 
town” … because areas of land in a commonhold need not be geographically 
proximate.’7 
 
Essentially, commonhold belongs to the family of strata title ownership schemes 
under which purchasers acquire rights in relation to a layer of airspace above the 
surface of the strata scheme land. The commonhold scheme follows the tradition of 
strata title systems in the sense that owners obtain three indivisible rights: the 
individual ownership of the unit itself, the share of the ownership in common parts 
                                                 
7 Official Report, House of Commons, 8 January 2002; vol 377, col 430 
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and membership of a managing body or association which has statutory responsibility 
for management of the strata scheme land (Van der Merwe, 1994). In the 
commonhold world, the notion is preserved although the rules are varied slightly in 
the forms of the registered freehold estate of the unit together with the exclusive 
membership of a private company limited by guarantee (the commonhold association) 
which will own the registered freehold estate in commonhold land designated as 
Common Parts and has statutory responsibility for management thereof. 
 
Commonhold is governed by a combination of legislation comprising statues and 
regulations. They are: 
 
i ). Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
ii ). Commonhold Regulations 
iii ). Commonhold (Land Registration) Rules 
iv ). Procedures Rules 
v ). The Company Acts 
vi ). The Insolvency Acts 
 
According to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, each commonhold is 
established accompanied by two sets of documents, the memorandum of association 
and articles of association. These documents form the constitution of the commonhold 
association. The memorandum of association records the particulars of the 
commonhold association and stipulates its duties, power as well as position in relation 
with the external world. It is therefore a piece of solid evidence of authority conferred 
to the commonhold association which altogether set out the boundaries or scope of its 
power. On the other hand, the articles of association contains procedures and 
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regulations in regard to internal affairs of the organization. The articles of association 
is thus a principal reference for anything related to collective choice decision making, 
examples of which range from unit-holders’ membership of the commonhold 
association and qualification of directors to general meeting procedures and voting 
mechanisms. 
 
In addition to the memorandum of association and articles of association, created by 
regulations made under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 is another 
document named the commonhold community statement. Unlike the articles of 
association which covers decision rules of the collective choice level, the 
commonhold community statement is all about the operational level with a minority 
of the provisions being exceptions. It contains a framework for management of 
day-to-day operations and control of unit-holders’ behaviour within the commonhold. 
The miscellaneous house rules attached may be as comprehensive as forbidding 
nuisance and annoyance caused to others and requirements of the commonhold 
association directors’ consent for keeping pets. The document also clearly spells out 
each unit-holders’ rights and obligations. These rights and obligations are from three 
different sources, the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, the regulations 
and the applicant for the establishment of the commonhold, who are often the 
developer. The first two prescribe an array of mandatory terms, most of which are not 
permitted to change or be omitted, whereas the last is allowed to include any terms as 
he think fit, provided that the additional contents do not conflict with the 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. 
 
The repeated appearance of the guiding principles behind the formulation of the 
institution of Commonhold during the passage of the Commonhold Bill suggests a 
 32
need for proper remarks. The most imperative of them, the principle of uniformity of 
structure, is briefly discussed here. 
 
It is of the UK Government’s view that the core structural elements of the 
commonhold, i.e. the memorandum of association, articles of association and the 
commonhold community statement should be uniform. Authors of 
commonhold-related publications have made their comments on top of the 
explanation of the matters, which is quoted here: 
 
‘There is no reason why this aspiration [of uniformity of structure] should not be 
achieved in relation to the memorandum and articles of associations, given the 
comparatively limited scope of those documents and the narrow range of objectives of 
a commonhold association. The Consultation Paper published by the Lord 
Chancellors’ Department on 10 October 2002 seeks to put this into practice by 
providing that the memorandum of association should not be capable of any 
amendment; and that the articles of association should only be variable in part. As the 
Post-Consultation Report dated August 2003 establishes, it is unlikely that there will 
be any significant departure from these proposals. 
 
As far as the commonhold community statement is concerned, however, the widely 
differing types of development suitable for commonhold that are likely to be 
encountered – from a converted house containing two flats to a purpose built block 
containing fifty; from a mixed use marina development to a holiday chalet site; from 
an industrial estate to a shopping centre – make it most unlikely that substantial 
uniformity will be achieved in practice. 
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The authors suggest that a commonhold community statement which seeks to impose 
too much uniformity at the expense of flexibility will prove just as unpopular. The 
Post-Consultation Report dated August 2003 appends a draft commonhold community 
statement which seeks to accommodate the need for flexibility by including some 
provisions which are intended to be mandatory with others which may be adopted or 
omitted to meet the particular needs, desires and contingencies of any given 
commonhold association.’8 
 
It is in effect this principle of uniformity that leads to the strict requirements of two of 
the three sets of core documents of the commonhold, the memorandum of association 
and the articles of association in prescribed form as well as mandatory contents to be 
included in the commonhold community statement. These stipulations have enormous 
consequences on effective management of self-governing commonhold associations 
and thus success of the institutional arrangement of commonhold and are to be 
examined in detail in later chapters. 
 
4.3 Constitutional level 
4.3.1 Definition and protection of individual rights 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
Since coming into force on 2 October, 2000, The Human Rights Act 1998 has been a 
shield of English individuals against infringement of their instinct rights by rendering 
it unlawful, unless by reason of an Act of Parliament, for a public authority to violate 
Convention rights. The Act in effect incorporates into the English legal system the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also 
known as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Schedule 1 of the Act 
                                                 
8 Fetherstonhaugh, G., Sefton, M., Peters, E. (2004) Commonhold, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
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specifies the Convention it upholds including a list of Conventional rights and 
protocols, which are in principle identical to the ECHR. 
 
Article 1 of the First Protocol shown below has a particularly close tie to property 
ownership.  
 
‘PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.’ 
 
The Bill of Rights 
In the British world of constitutional monarchy, it was determined that certain 
constitutional requirements where the actions of the Crown require the consent of the 
governed as represented in Parliament must be set out to reasonably limit the power of 
the Crown. Among the basic documents of the English constitutional law, the Bill of 
Rights 1689 (long title: An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and 
Settling the Succession of the Crown) serves this purpose. The Bill of Rights 1689 is a 
stipulation of a number of positive rights that the English citizen / residents ought to 
enjoy. 
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The basic tenets of the Bill of Rights 1689 are that every Englishman possessed 
certain immutable civil and political rights, which included: 
 
i ). freedom from royal interference with the law (thus the Sovereign was prohibited 
from establishing his own courts or to act as a judge himself) 
ii ). freedom from taxation by royal prerogative, without agreement by Parliament 
iii ). freedom to petition the King 
iv ). freedom from a peace-time standing army, without agreement by Parliament 
v ). freedom to have arms for defense, as allowed by law 
vi ). freedom to elect members of Parliament without interference from the Sovereign 
vii ). the freedom of speech in Parliament, in that proceedings in Parliament were not 
to be questioned in the courts or in any body outside Parliament itself (the basis 
of modern parliamentary privilege) 
viii ). freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, and excessive bail 
ix ). freedom from fines and forfeitures without trial9 
 
Despite its British origin, the Bill of Rights 1689 demonstrates its influence over the 
legal basis of other countries including non-constitutional monarchy. For instance, 
The Bill of Rights 1689 is a predecessor of the United States Constitution and the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even the aforementioned 
European Convention on Human Rights bears some form of resemblance to the Bill 
of Rights 1689. 
 
4.3.2 Autonomy of self-governance 
The communal facilities and common parts of a development is undoubtedly a form 
                                                 
9 Bill of Rights 1689 
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of common pool resource. Commons of this kind are quite unlike the traditional 
natural resource commons such as forest, lakes or even electromagnetic spectrum10  
from which units of resource are extracted or utilities derived for the benefits of a 
major group comprising people of a region, province or the whole nation. They are 
different in the sense that while the government is often keen to retain considerable 
power of control over appropriation of the latter but comparably less over the former. 
This phenomenon characterized by resources largely held under anarchy or near 
anarchy is explained by the fact that these resources simply cannot be controlled 
effectively by one or more governments 11 . Essentially these commons in the 
developed world are given much cost-driven ‘respect’ as a result. The commonhold 
commons is unlikely an exception. 
 
This is not to say the UK government is unaware of the externalities of city image and 
safety problems brought by privately owned buildings, nor is it ignorant of the need to 
manage. In fact, the government has done its best to prepare a well-planned strata title 
institution in which self-governing commonhold associations operate under 
minimized governmental or other external intervention and externalities are 
internalized. 
 
Throughout all levels of decision making there is no lack of proof of the government’s 
intention that the self-governing commonhold associations should be free to devise 
their own rules and deal with the affairs of the commonhold. The originally 
mandatory appropriation rules in the commonhold community statement, for instance, 
                                                 
10 Ryan, P.S. (2004) Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource 
Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law 
Review, 10(2), p. 285. 
11 Lai, W.C. and Yu, T. (2003) The power of supply and demand, Hong Kong University Press. 
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were made optional in the revised draft so that commonhold associations can tailor 
these rules to suit their commonhold. The dispute resolution mechanism at the 
collective choice level is also moulded based on the same belief in the way that 
conflicts concerning the commonhold are preferably resolved by the commonhold 
association. 
 
Although that the institution of Commonhold was not made compulsory has indeed 
attracted much criticism during the passage of the Common Bill, it is justifiable to 
believe the arrangement is a result of not only the government’s respect to the power 
of the market but also one to the commons (common parts of building) appropriators’ 
choice regarding formation of a self-governing organization in which they have the 
rights and duties to administer their matters. As the Minister explains during the 
Second Reading in the House of Commons: 
 
‘… we believe that commonhold offers enormous attractions, but it would be wrong 
of us to prescribe it at this stage. The property market is complex and fluid, and we 
think that the scheme should have time to bed in. We want to see how the market 
responds to commonhold, so the answer … is, in short, “Let the market decides.” We 
believe that it will make the appropriate decision and recognize the full advantages of 
commonhold.’12 
 
4.3.3 Property rights 
A sound system of property must be backed by a legal system in which rule of law 
prevails. As a matter of law, the aforementioned constitutional law, being a significant 
part of the established rule of law, has facilitated shaping a solid private property 
                                                 
12 Official Report, House of Commons, 8 January 2002; col 428 
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system. In the English common law system, since grants of allodial titles are 
non-existent, the greatest extent of the private property rights in landed interest lie in a 
fee simple absolute. According to the government’s policy, freehold estate in the 
commonhold units should be nothing less than the standard fee simple owners’. 
 
The property right system is realized in the institution of commonhold. Numerous 
provisions were drafted in unit-holders’ favour in respect of protecting their freehold 
interest, even thought in some cases detriments inevitably follow. Specifically, the 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 makes it undoubtedly impossible for a 
commonhold community statement to prevent or restrict the transfer of a 
commonhold unit13, irrespective of the transfer being a gift or for consideration. On 
the matter of sanctions in relation to defaulting unit-holders, the government insisted 
that forfeiture, a remedy available to a holder of superior interest to prematurely 
terminate an inferior interest, should never be made available to the commonhold 
associations due to non-existence of ‘landlord and tenant relationship’ as such. All this 
tiny little bit of manifestation of the private property right system, coupled with the 
constitutional law, reflects the government’s determination in maintaining a sound 
legal system in which the private property right system operates without distortion 
both in theory and practice. 
 
4.3.4 The rule of law 
The first step to rule of law is the existence of law. Since 1189, time before which was 
marked as time immemorial, common law has been a core element of the English law 
system. The common law system is based on the notion of stare decisis, requiring that 
precedents must be recognized. That is, the decision of a court binds future decision 
                                                 
13 Section 15(2), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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of the courts of the same or lower level when they encounter a case of similar nature, 
save that legislature provides to the contrary or a higher court overrules the judgment. 
This imparts the legal system with certainty in operation and predictability in the 
outcomes. 
 
As the legal system evolves, the doctrine of separation of power materializes as the 
judiciary is separated from the administrative and legislative bodies. The result is that 
judges are no longer eligible for making law as they could do in the ancient times. 
Another important doctrine, judicial independence, is up to ensure that the judiciary is 
unbiased and free from governmental, political or private influence. Judicial 
independence is safeguarded by a number of measures in the UK, including an 
independent appointment system in which selection is made by senior members of the 
judiciary, security of tenure which lasts for a lifetime and judicial immunity shielding 
members of the judiciary from actions against them for their official conduct. 
 
Moreover, the common law system incorporates the concept of natural justice, which 
refers to certain legal principles that naturally exist and requires no enactment to be 
applied. Natural justice functions on the ground that man is by nature good and 
benevolent, that a person of good intent should not be harmed, as well as that one 
should treat others as one would like to be treated14. Some identified rules of nature 
justice are given below: 
 
i ). A person accused of a crime, or at risk of some form of loss, should be given 
adequate notice about the proceedings including any charges against him.  
ii ). A person making a decision should declare any personal interest they may have 
                                                 
14 Brogan, M., Gleeson, W., Foley, T., Siow, V., and Ejsak, T. Heinemann Legal Studies p12-13 
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in the proceedings.  
iii ). A person who makes a decision should be unbiased and act in good faith. He 
therefore can not be one of the parties in the case, or have an interest in the 
outcome. As the Latin maxim goes, ‘nemo judex in sua causa’, i.e. no man is 
permitted to be judge in his own cause.  
iv ). Proceedings should be conducted so they are fair to all the parties. This is 
expressed in the Latin maxim ‘audi alteram partem’, i.e. let the other side be 
heard.  
v ). Each party to a proceeding is entitled to ask questions and contradict the 
evidence of the opposing party.  
vi ). A decision-maker should take into account relevant considerations and 
extenuating circumstances, and ignore irrelevant considerations.  
vii ). Justice should be seen to be done. If the community is satisfied that justice has 
been done, they will continue to place their faith in the courts.15 
 
Besides the common law jurisdiction, an array of legislation makes up the rule of law 
covering aspects such as crime, property and tort. 
 
With all these legal principles, sophisticated mechanisms and accurate realization 
thereof, the legal system wherein the institution of Commonhold operates is one in 
which not only the existence of rule of law but also the high standard of law as well as 
the embedded fairness and justice are treasured and upheld. 
 
4.4 Collective choice level 
4.4.1 The common pool resources governance organization 
                                                 
15 Binmore, K. (2005) Natural Justice, Oxford University Press 
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Existence of a self-governance organization 
The self-governance / management body in a commonhold is the commonhold 
association. The commonhold association exists as a company limited by guarantee 
recognized in law16, the purpose of which is to manage the commonhold17. In fact, 
commonhold associations are formally incorporated and registered under the 
Company Act 1985, which governs the operations of common associations in the 
same way as it does to conventional companies, unless there are express provisions to 
the contrary. 
 
Among the submission to the Register of Companies for registration, the 
memorandum of association and articles of association are two important documents 
that contains the core sets of rules for the collective choice decision arena. 
 
Authority and scope of actions 
The drafting of the memorandum of association runs in the spirit of the commonhold 
institution in that it must follows a prescribed form. Provided in the memorandum of 
association, along with the numerous necessary details such as the name and status of 
the commonhold association as well as members’ limited liability, are the objects for 
which the commonhold association is established. The object of the commonhold 
association is twofold. The primary object is stated in paragraph 3 of the 
memorandum, which reads: 
 
‘[The objects are] … to exercise the functions of a commonhold association in 
relation to [specify the name of the commonhold and its location] in accordance with 
                                                 
16 Section 34(1), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
17 Section 35, Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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the commonhold community statement, as amended from time to time, and any 
provision made by or by virtue of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
(“the 2002 Act”) and the doing of all such things as are incidental or conducive to the 
attainment of that object.’18 
 
Secondarily, the original draft memorandum of association state the possible actions 
in which the commonhold association is allowed to take as various means to further 
the object of carrying out the function of the association, although they are somehow 
omitted after revision. These range from the power ‘to make, administer and enforce 
provisions regulating or limiting the use of the Common Parts or any specified parts 
thereof’19 to that ‘to insure (and use the proceeds of insurance for the purposes of 
rebuilding or reinstating), repair and maintain the commonhold or any part or parts 
thereof, including the Common Parts and any of the Commonhold Units.’ 
 
In other words the memorandum of association is the fundamental source of authority 
which all together sets out the boundaries or scope of the commonhold association’s 
power. This officially vested authority is vital support of upholding the self-governing 
commonhold associations’ decisions. 
 
Membership of the collective choice decision making arena 
Membership rules of the commonhold association decide who has the rights to 
participate in decision making at the collective choice level decision making arena. 
Occasionally the eligibility of a member and thus validity of his vote by virtue of the 
membership rules may be so critical that it alters the outcome of the vote about a 
                                                 
18 Paragraph 3 of the draft memorandum of association 
19 Paragraph 4.5 of the draft memorandum of association 
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controversial proposal. In view of this, the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 
2002 impose well-defined restrictions on the eligibility of membership20, the nature of 
which varies as the development approach three different stages. 
 
During the pre-commonhold period beginning with the incorporation of the 
commonhold association and ending with the registration of the land as commonhold, 
the subscribers, who are the ones having subscribed their names to the memorandum 
of association and applied for incorporation of the commonhold association21, are 
entitled to be the members of the commonhold association. With their names entered 
in the register of members, the subscribers’ memberships are unquestionably 
manifested22, as the subsequent members’ should be. 
 
During the transitional period starting from the registration of the land as 
commonhold till the first unit-holder gains his entitlement to be registered as the 
proprietor of a unit, the aforementioned subscribers are still the members of the 
association. The developer may during this period make himself an addition to the 
membership.23 
 
After the end of the transitional period denoted by the first unit-holder being entitled 
to register as the proprietor of a unit, the commonhold proceeds to a stage when 
co-ownership comes into exists, therefore needs for management arise and collective 
choice decisions are to be made. This is the stage in which self-governance actually 
concerns. Since then the unit-holders are the only group of people who can become 
                                                 
20 Schedule 3, part 2, paragraph 10, Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
21 Section 1(1), Companies Act 1985 
22 Section 22(1), Companies Act 1985, this section is expressly mentioned to apply to a commonhold 
association subject to Schedule 3 
23 Schedule 3, Part 2, paragraph 5(3), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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members of the commonhold association24. It should be noted that the membership of 
the commonhold association is, along the traditional line of strata title schemes, an 
indivisible right attached to ownership the corresponding units25. The membership to 
certain extent is also a compulsorily imposed obligation which is not possible to be 
ridded of by resignation. On the other hand, the original subscribers and developer 
can resign their membership, but they can choose not to do so even if they retain no 
ownership of any units. 
 
Alternation of the collective choice rules for decision making 
The participants of the collective choice decision making arena have the right to 
decide whether alternations to the governing decision rules should be approved. The 
collective choice rules for decision making in a commonhold are set out in the two 
sets of principal documents, the memorandum of association and articles of 
association. Alternations to these constitutions of the commonhold association require 
passage of a special resolution26. To avoid ambiguities, the alternations, which must 
also be in line with the prescribed forms of the documents, are to be registered with 
the Land Registry and only by doing so would the alternations take effect.27 
 
The success of the institution of commonhold, as numerous other institution 
governing common pool resources do, very much relies on a collection of 
unambiguously delineated, non-conflicting decision making rules in hierarchical order. 
Efforts were made to secure the absence of contraventions between rules of different 
levels. The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 expressly specifies that any 
                                                 
24 Schedule 3, Part 2, paragraph 10, Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
25 Schedule 3, Part 2, paragraph 12(a), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
26 Section 4(1), Companies Act 1985 
27 Schedule 3, part 1, paragraph 3(1), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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provision in the memorandum or articles of association contravening the regulations 
has no effects28. Any unit-holder who considers that the memorandum or articles of 
association are inconsistent with the regulations may launch an application to the 
court for a declaration to such effect.29 
 
Termination 
The commonhold development may eventually come to an end. At that time it is 
necessary to have certain guidelines for the commonhold association to dispose the 
company’s assets and redistribute unit-holders’ contribution, which could easily have 
been subjects of disputes. 
 
The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 specifies comprehensively the 
procedures to handle the winding-up of commonhold associations. The situations of 
termination are separated into two categories, compulsory winding-up and voluntary 
winding-up. 
 
In a situation of compulsory winding-up, willingness of the commonhold association 
membership is irrelevant. The regular procedure for compulsorily winding-up an 
ordinary company under the Insolvency Act 1986 is equally applicable to the 
commonhold association subject to several modifications. No moratorium is imposed 
on the compulsory winding-up of a commonhold association. 
 
The situation is a bit different for voluntary winding-up. Given the additional element 
of individual unit-holder’ willingness on the matter of winding-up, the rules on 
                                                 
28 Schedule 3, paragraph 2(4), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
29 Section 40(1)(a), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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voluntary winding-up must safeguard the objecting group’s interests especially in the 
absence of unanimity as they streamline the termination process. Again, the 
procedures for voluntary winding-up of a commonhold association follow those for an 
ordinary company laid down in the Insolvency Act 1986 subject to several 
modifications. 
 
It is worth mentioning that prior to the winding-up resolution, the commonhold 
association must pass a termination-statement resolution30, absence of which would 
avoid the winding-up resolution31. The termination-statement resolution32 approves 
the terms in the termination statement, which dominates the allocation of the 
commonhold association’s assets and transfer of legal estate in the units and common 
parts to respective owners. 
 
As for the winding-up resolution, the requirement for passage is stricter than that for a 
common solvent company, demanding at least 80 percent of the members of the 
association voting in favour, compared with a three-fourths majority vote for the 
ordinary ones. Such increased difficulty is by reason of protection of the objecting 
parties but should also be a result of favour in the commonhold. These notions further 
extend to the appointment of the liquidator for the commonhold association. The 
commonhold association can appoint the liquidator in general meeting only if the 
winding-up resolution was passed by unanimous vote. Otherwise, another procedure, 
distinguished by appointment of liquidator by the court, applies. In this way, it ensures 
that the liquidator for the commonhold association is a neutral person who does not 
act with bias against any parties. 
                                                 
30 Section 43(1)(b), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
31 Section 43(1), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
32 Section 43(1)(b), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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4.4.2 Representatives and election rules 
Representatives of the members of the commonhold association 
A commonhold association is a company limited by guarantee. The representatives for 
the members of an organization as such are the board of directors who bear the 
responsibility of running the commonhold for the benefit of the members 33 . 
Qualifications of the representing directors and rules concerning their appointments, 
being internal affairs of the commonhold association at the collective choice level, are 
bound by the articles of association. The size of the board should be two at the 
minimum34 whereas the maximum number of directors should either be six or a 
number to be determined by an ordinary resolution of the commonhold association as 
the original draft prescribed form of the articles of association stipulates, despite the 
subsequent draft being silent on this matter. 
 
Nomination rules 
The appointment and removal of directors are along with other internal affairs 
governed by the articles of association. Articles 46 to 54 of the draft prescribed form 
provide different procedures for appointment and removal of directors under several 
possible circumstances. Summarized below are the most significant of the said 
provisions. 
 
The developer, subject to the rights granted in the commonhold community statement, 
may appoint up to two directors during the transitional period and remove or replace 
any of the directors he has appointed. After the end of the transactional period, 
                                                 
33 Section 35 Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
34 Article 45, draft prescribed form of articles of association 
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provided that the developer still retains ownership of more than one-quarter of the 
units, he is given the right to appoint one-quarter of the maximum number of directors 
in total as well as the right of removal and replacement of the above. Directors 
appointed in this way should cease to hold office once the develop ceases to be the 
owners of more than one-quarter of the units. 
 
After the end of the transactional period, the commonhold association may by 
ordinary resolution appoint directors and decide which directors would fall within the 
one-third who should retire by rotation at the annual general meeting as the law 
prescribes. However, other than proposal by members with voting rights, there exists 
another route for appointment of directors, appointment by other directors’ 
recommendation. A new director cannot be appointed unless either he is nominated by 
the directors or notice has been given that his appointment is proposed. 
 
The mechanism for resolution regarding election of director is discussed together with 
decision making rules for other matters below under the heading of decision making 
rules. 
 
Qualifications of directors 
As reasonably expected, members of the commonhold association have to right to 
become a director. According to Article 44 of the articles of association, however, a 
director of a commonhold association need not be drawn from the ranks of the 
members, i.e. he can be a non-member35. The directors of a commonhold association 
can well be professional directors appointed by the members to run the commonhold 
association on their behalf. This nonetheless necessitates protection for the members’ 
                                                 
35 Article 44, articles of association 
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rights and upholding their sovereignty over matters like recommendation of directors 
just mentioned. Article 44 must be amended to give such effect that at least one 
director must be a member of the commonhold association should the commonhold in 
question comprises more than six units36. 
 
Powers of directors 
Unless provided to the contrary, the business of the commonhold association should 
be managed by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the commonhold 
association37. To be specific, a director’s power entitle him to attend, speak and 
propose a resolution at any general meeting of the commonhold association, 
notwithstanding that he might not be a member director.38 In such case, he has no 
right to vote on the resolution. There is a notable exception though. Non-member 
directors can still influence the outcome of the resolution and thus commonhold 
affairs in such a way that the chairman of the meeting has the right to a casting vote, 
regardless of his membership status. 
 
Among the directors’ powers, there is also the power of delegation. The directors of 
the commonhold association may delegate their powers to a committee comprising 
two or more directors, members of the commonhold association and others on the 
condition that the members of any committee of this kind should from time to time 
consist of members of the commonhold as the majority.39 
 
Powers of the directors may also be delegated to managing directors or agents who 
                                                 
36 Section 13(4), commonhold regulations 
37 Article 56, articles of association 
38 Article 69, articles of association 
39 Article 58, articles of association 
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the directors deem fit to desirably exercise such power40. The delegations may be 
accompanied by conditions imposed by the directors and depending on the situations, 
be altered or revoked. Delegation of power must be made in accordance with the 
commonhold community statement. Moreover, it is set out in the articles of 
association that certain procedural requirements and constraints on delegation must be 
observed. Highlighted below are the two most influential respects. Any delegation of 
power in the aforementioned manner must be sanctioned by ordinary resolution by the 
members of the commonhold association. Besides, it is stipulated that a record of 
details of power having been delegated must be properly kept. This is a crucial 
measure to clarify accountability and aid supervision of the agents’ functioning, the 
latter being one of the duties of the directors under the articles of association41. 
 
By delegation of their powers the directors could utilize the expertise of the managing 
agents to facilitate management of the commonhold. The delegation itself, however, 
constitutes to nothing in terms of excluding the directors’ liabilities for 
non-performance of his duties42. 
 
Duties of directors 
As subsection 2 of section 35 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
quoted below provides, the directors of the commonhold association are obligated to 
manage the commonhold. 
 
‘The directors of the commonhold association shall, in particular, use any right, power, 
or procedure conferred or created by virtue of section 37 for the purpose of preventing, 
                                                 
40 Article 57, articles of association 
41 Article 77, articles of association 
42 See Lubrano v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 4038 (1993) 
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remedying, or curtailing a failure on the part of a unit-holder to comply with a 
requirement or duty imposed on him by virtue of the commonhold community 
statement or a provision of this Part.’43 
 
Virtually all this subsection expressly states is that the duty to manage entails the duty 
to enforce the various rules of the commonhold against unit-holders (the targets of 
enforcement should include the tenants of the unit-holders as well44). What exactly 
are to be done remain contentious without any hints on the tangible duties of the 
directors.  
 
For the sake of comparison between the vague provisions of the Commonhold and 
Leasehold Reform Act 2002 and the procedures and operations the directors may get 
involved, listed as follows is an adopted summarization highlighting the major 
responsibilities of the board of directors. 
 
The major responsibilities of the board of directors of a commonhold association 
a. Keeping proper records of the members and business of the commonhold 
association 
b. Holding annual meetings of the commonhold association 
c. Ensuring that proper personnel are engaged to perform the required tasks 
d. Ensuring the proper maintenance o the commonhold 
e. Maintaining adequate insurance cover for the commonhold 
f. Preparing budgets and assessments for regular expenditure and for the reserve 
fund 
                                                 
43 Section 35(2), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
44 Section 35(4), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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g. Ensuring that proper accounts of income and expenditure are prepared 
h. Maintaining and operating a proper internal complaints procedure 
i. Enforcing the provisions of the commonhold community statement, the 
memorandum of association and articles of association and the provisions of the 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 and regulations made under it.45 
 
4.4.3 Decision making mechanisms 
Entitlement to vote 
According to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, generally 
unit-holders are the only group of people who can become members of the 
commonhold association and enjoy the attached right to vote in meetings of the 
association. However, from time to time special circumstances compel deviations 
form this principle. In such cases the non-member who is entitled to vote may be a 
receiver in the event of disability or financial difficulty of members, a mortgagee who 
has interest in a commonhold unit, the chairman of a meeting, a tenant of the 
members or a proxy appointed by members. 
 
Mental health disability 
When a court has made an order concerning that an otherwise eligible member is in a 
state of mental disorder resulting in disability, the articles of association provides that 
the member’s receiver or other person authorized in that behalf appointed by the court 
may vote on behalf of the disabled member.46 
 
Financial disability 
                                                 
45 Fetherstonhaugh, G., Sefton, M. and Peters, E. (2004) Commonhold, Oxford University Press 
46 Article 35, articles of association 
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The voting right is vested in the receiver appointed by the court or by a mortgagee, an 
administrator, a trustee in bankruptcy a commissioner in sequestration or other 
persons who are in a similar role in the event of financial difficulty such as 
bankruptcy of a member. 
 
In both scenarios of disability, for the relevant persons to exercise their rights to vote 
in the commonhold association meetings, evidence of their authority must be 
furnished to the directors’ satisfaction. There is no requirement of disposition in 
advance, though, making it possible to present the evidence during the meetings. 
 
Mortgagees’ right to vote 
Entitlement to vote can be claimed by the mortgagee who take possession of a unit on 
the unit-holder’s defaults on payment of monies due if notice by him is served to the 
commonhold association declaring that he has exercised his right to possession of the 
unit.47 
 
Tenants’ right to vote 
In their own rights tenants of unit-holders enjoy no privileges to vote in meetings of 
the commonhold association but subject to the unit-holder’s it is possible for the 
tenants to vote in place of the unit-holder. Under the institution of Commonhold this 
is left to be a matter of private dealing between the two parties 
 
The chairman’s right to vote 
The chairman is entitled to a casting vote regardless of their membership status.48 
                                                 
47 Article 36, articles of association 
48 Article 27, articles of association 
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Proxy voting 
If a member of the commonhold association is not available for voting, he can appoint 
a single person, the proxy, to represent him and cast his vote. A number of provisions 
exist in the articles of association for systemic control of arrangements of this kind, 
imposing constraints on both the appointing members and their proxies. The articles 
restrict that only if votes are to be taken by poll are proxies allowed to vote on behalf 
of the members49. In this regard, members are supposed to instruct their proxies to 
demand a vote by poll. As for the members who intend to appoint a proxy, notice in 
accordance with the form provided in the articles of association must be served to the 
commonhold association 50 . For those who would like to have their proxies 
representing them in a series of general meetings over a period of time, give 
instructions on the nature of the vote or limit their proxies’ freedom to act, similar 
prescriptions are made on the various forms of notice for these special instructions 
which must also be observed in declaring their intention to be represented in a specific 
manner.51 
 
Votes per member 
The number of votes to which each member should entitle has been very much a 
controversy indeed. In principle, the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act grants 
every member of the commonhold association as many votes as the number of units 
he owns. The principle of ‘one vote per unit’, however, may not be fully realized by 
reason of the mechanism of voting. The votes subsequent to the first a member is 
entitled to counts only in a vote by poll but not one conducted on the default mode of 
                                                 
49 Article 38, articles of association 
50 Article 39, articles of association 
51 Article 40, 41, articles of association 
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show of hands. The only relief available to members holding multiple units who 
would like his all his votes to be counted is to insist upon a vote by poll, which can 
only be demanded by the chairman, a minimum of two members having the right to 
vote, or a member or members representing not less than one-tenth of the total voting 
rights of all the member having the right to vote at the meeting52. 
 
Quorum 
In order to ensure the decisions of the commonhold association are made as a result of 
collective choice representing the views of the majority members, the articles of 
association provides that no business may be transacted at any general meeting unless 
a quorum is present53. As the original articles of association provides, a quorum 
usually adopted in ordinary companies was put forward, requiring 20 percent of the 
members of the commonhold association entitled to vote upon the business to be 
transacted, or two members of such status, whichever is the greater, be present or 
represented by proxy. 
 
In spite of the quorum requirement, it was identifiable that in certain situations 
especially when the unit-holders show no enthusiasm in collective decision making, 
the definition in percentage may easily render the affairs of the commonhold 
association under domination of a small collaboration. A demonstration of such 
outcomes would be that for a commonhold association with ten members, only a 
quorum of two is needed. In cases as such, certain requirements on the types of 
resolution like a unanimous resolution, are nothing more than that the more lenient 
ones like a special resolution (75 percent), would demand. 
                                                 
52 Article 23, articles of association 
53 Article 16, articles of association 
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The solution given by the revised draft is to set, depending on the type of resolution, 
percentage requirements and the minimum number of members required, whichever 
greater, for a quorum. This results in what the following table presents: 
 
Type of resolution 
Percentage of members 
require for quorum 
Minimum number of 
members required 
Ordinary 20 3 
Special 35 4 
Unanimous 50 5 
 
If the requisite quorum is not present within half an hour after the commencement of 
the meeting, or during a meeting the quorum ceases to be present, the consequences 
would be that the meeting must stand adjourned to the same day in the coming week 
at the same time and place, or to the time and location as the directors may specify. 
 
Resolutions 
The resolution requisite to satisfy the decision of the commonhold association at 
general meetings varies depending on the nature of the subject of the matters 
concerned. The rules on resolution are given by article 22 of the articles of association. 
While an ‘ordinary resolution’, i.e. a simple majority of the votes of the members 
having cast their votes, suffices for the great majority of these affairs, matters of grave 
consequence or those in which more substantial interest require sanction by special 
(75 percent of the votes of the members voting) or even unanimous resolutions (100 
percent of the votes of the members voting). These requirements, particularly the part 
on the ‘percent of the votes of the members voting’ make a great contrast with that of 
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a specified majority, which demand 80 or 100 percent of the membership (instead of 
merely those having cast their votes). Listed below in tabular form are some 
frequently encountered matters and the corresponding resolution required54. 
 
Matters for which ordinary resolution (i.e. resolutions requiring a simple 
majority of the votes of the members voting) only are required: 
1. Whether a director should be voted out of office 
2. Whether to approve a contract with a managing agent 
3. Whether to appoint a committee 
4. Whether to add, delete, or amend any rule contained in the default of optional 
provisions of the commonhold community statement 
5. Whether to change the size of a commonhold unit or the common parts with the 
consent of the unit-holder and / or registered chargee 
6. Whether to alter the common parts 
7. Whether (with the consent of the developer) to amend the development rights 
 
 
Matters for which a special majority (75 percent) of the votes of the members 
voting is required: 
1. Whether to authorize the transfer of part of a commonhold unit 
2. Whether the directors of the commonhold association should be entitled to any 
remuneration and, if so, the amount 
3. Approval of a commonhold assessment 
4. Approval of a reserve fund levy at an annual general meeting 
                                                 
54 Fetherstonhaugh, G., Sefton, M. and Peters, E. (2004) Commonhold, Oxford University Press 
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5. Whether to make a provision in place of a default provision in the commonhold 
community statement 
6. Whether (with the consent of the unit-holder) to change the permitted use of a 
commonhold unit 
7. Whether to change the percentage of the commonhold assessment or reserve 
fund levies allocated to a commonhold unit 
8. Whether to change the restrictions on the limited use areas 
 
Matters for which the unanimous votes of all the members voting is required: 
1. Whether to permit the creation of a charge over the common parts of the 
commonhold 
2. Applications to add land to a commonhold 
3. Whether to change the allocation of the votes given to a commonhold unit 
 
Matters for which a specific majority of 80 or 100 percent55 of the membership 
is required: 
1. Whether to voluntarily wind up the commonhold association 
 
 
4.4.4 Dispute resolution and sanction system 
The approach under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 to 
dispute resolution 
The system of sanctioning is an indispensable element within a common pool 
resource management organization that should always be introduced with an 
                                                 
55 The percentage of the resolution determines the corresponding steps to be taken for the winding-up. 
The main difference lies in the court’s intervention in the absence of unanimity. 
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extensive dispute resolution mechanism as a necessary complement. The 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 offers a comprehensive system 
covering both. 
 
While litigation is still treated as a remedy of last resort, the institution of 
Commonhold encourages the parties in disputes to engage in alternative dispute 
resolution which range from a mandatory internal complaints procedure at the lowest 
level, to the appointment of an ombudsman, arbitrator or mediator. This underlying 
principle of dispute resolution, in spite of no express provisions were written to such 
effects, were made patent in the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord 
Chancellors’ Department, during the Second Reading of the Commonhold Bill in the 
House of Commons: 
 
‘The commonhold scheme will provide for the enforcement of rights and duties 
between unit-holders and the commonhold association. Where internal dispute arises, 
we intend that the commonhold association and unit-holders should undertake a 
three-step process, including alternative dispute resolution, to resolve any conflict. 
 
Assuming that the informal processes fail, the first formal process will be an internal 
complaints procedure. Secondly, under clause 41, we will prescribe the use of the 
commonhold ombudsman. The commonhold ombudsman will be modeled on the 
independent housing ombudsman, who has a wide range of dispute resolution 
procedures at his disposal, including arbitration, mediation and adjudication. The last 
recourse available will be to the court.’56 
                                                 
56 Official Report, House of Commons, 8 January 2002; col 425 
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It is accordingly of the government’s view that the mechanism for sanction and 
dispute resolution should encompass informal steps and a formal three-step process. 
The policy aims to keep dispute resolution internal to the commonhold association 
with as little resort to outsiders’ intervention such as the court’s as possible. 
 
Sources of duties 
Prerequisite to sanctions by any means is a clearly delineated scope of duties the 
parties in the commonhold should fulfill, failing which would constitute to a breach. 
Under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 there are three identifiable 
references of the duties imposed on the commonhold association, the members of the 
association and in some cases, their tenants. They are: 
 
i ). The commonhold community statement, the contents of which are prescribed by 
regulations 
ii ). The memorandum and articles of association of the commonhold association, the 
contents of which are also prescribed by regulations 
iii ). Other stipulations of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 or 
regulations promulgated under the Act 
 
The commonhold association’s response to a breach 
The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 impose the duty of policing within 
the commonhold on the board of directors. It provides that ‘the directors of a 
commonhold association shall exercise their powers so as to permit or facilitates so 
far as possible the exercise by each unit-hold of his rights, and the enjoyment by each 
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unit-holder of the freehold estate in his unit’57. The precise powers of enforcement in 
the directors’ arsenal, as the Act stipulates, are ‘right, power, or procedure conferred 
or created by virtue of section 37 for the purpose of preventing, remedying or 
curtailing a failure on the part of a unit-holder to comply with a requirement or duty 
imposed on him by virtue of the commonhold community statement or a provision of 
this Part’58. Notwithstanding the duty of enforcement of the directors, the Act adds 
that the board of directors ‘need not take action if they reasonably think that inaction 
is in the best interests of establishing or maintaining harmonious relationship between 
all the unit-holders, and that it will not cause any unit-holder (other than the defaulter) 
significant loss or significant disadvantage’.59 
 
Having considered the duties imposed and powers conferred by the Commonhold and 
Leasehold Reform Act 2002, it becomes apparent that the reason steps the board of 
directors should take in the event of a breach of duty by a unit-holder would not 
deviate much from the followings: 
 
a. The directors should first refer to their powers of enforcement given by the 
regulations promulgated under section 37(1) of the Act. It is equally important to 
decide if any action should be taken for a harmonious commonhold environment. 
b. If they are of the view that some form of sanction is appropriate, they should 
nonetheless make an attempt of informal resolution of the matter. This can be in 
the form of a private negotiation or discussion between the breaching unit-holder 
and the directors. 
c. If the informal resolution attempt turned out to be futile, it is reasonable for the 
                                                 
57 Section 35(1), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
58 Section 35(2), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
59 Section 35(3)(a), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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directors to activate the internal complaints procedures. 
d. If the internal complaints procedure did not resolve the issues, the directors 
should consider whether the dispute is one suitable to be brought forward to the 
commonhold ombudsman. 
e. In case the situation caused by the unit-holder’s breach of duties is so urgent that 
it requires immediate attention, for instance, repairing a dangerous structure in 
the unit, the directors should consider sending relief themselves. They should 
serve upon the defaulting unit-holder an indemnity notice, provided that their 
commonhold community statement so permits. 
f. Instigation of legal procedures should be last resort of the directors when 
everything stated failed to resolve the disputes. 
 
The internal complaints procedure is established as a screening system for the purpose 
of internalizing dispute resolution within the self-governing commonhold association 
on one hand, while on the other curtailing unnecessary lawsuits arising from disputes 
which could have been resolved by any other means but litigation. 
 
Therefore it is not a matter of choice that the parties in grievance instigate the 
commonhold association’s internal complaints procedure prior to engagement of the 
commonhold ombudsman or litigation. This is made clear in the commonhold 
community statement that, bar that urgency is involved, 
a. the dispute may not be litigated unless it has first been referred to the 
ombudsman; and 
b. the dispute may not be referred to the ombudsman unless the notice procedure 
(i.e. the internal complaints procedure) has first been attempted and 21 days has 
elapsed sine then. 
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In practice, if the matters are to be brought into the formal dispute resolution arena 
and the mandatory internal complaints procedure initiated, the complainants are 
required to serve a ‘complaints notice’ in a prescribed form to the commonhold 
association outlying the issues. The commonhold association should, after gathering 
and examining necessary details of the complaints, come to a conclusion either 
dismissing the complaints with a ‘reply notice’ or taking action of enforcement 
against the defaulting unit-holder by serving him a ‘default notice’. There notices 
must also be in accordance with the proscribed forms supplied in the annexation to the 
commonhold community statement. 
 
The commonhold ombudsman scheme 
The commonhold ombudsman scheme set up under the regulations promulgated under 
the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. In essence, the ombudsman is an 
independent external body, designation of which must be sanctioned by the Lord 
Chancellor, bearing the responsibility of handling disputes of all its members. 
Membership of the commonhold ombudsman scheme is available only to 
commonhold-associations but not the unit-holders, and it is compulsory60. 
 
The ombudsman is duty-bound to investigate any complaints referred to him. He must 
identify and reject the ones have not gone through the commonhold association’s 
internal complaints procedures or those not falling within the terms of the 
commonhold ombudsman scheme. For the valid complaints, the ombudsman should 
look into all the facts of the case and take the most suitable steps to resolve the 
disputes, which may include facilitating local settlement. The ombudsman may also 
                                                 
60 Regulation 16, Commonhold Regulations 
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introduce other forms of external alternate disputes resolution mechanisms like 
mediation or arbitration similar to their counterparts for construction disputes and 
personal injury. If his endeavour as such bears not fruit, he must based on his findings 
decide which remedies open to him should apply and convey the messages to the 
commonhold association and all parties involved. 
 
There is doubt, however, over the powers available to the commonhold ombudsman. 
Other than providing that the commomhold ombudsman is entitled to award 
compensation61, The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 makes no clear 
provisions on the powers or remedies available to him. It is suggested, by reference to 
the Independent Housing Ombudsman Scheme (IOH Scheme), a similar system in the 
UK for resolution of disputes between its members landlords (housing associations) 
and people receiving their service, the powers of the commonhold ombudsman is 
likely to include that granted in the IOH Scheme. 
 
Decision makers’ access to relevant information 
Relevant information for the purpose of decision making in the commonhold 
association and other common pool resource management organizations as well may 
be grouped into two categories, records of crucial documents and the changing 
conditions of the commonhold. 
 
Record keeping 
Management of the commonhold association often encounters the needs to refer to 
pervious documents in dealing with affairs the commonhold such as determining 
eligibility of a party or figuring out what remedies may be given. It is made 
                                                 
61 Section 42(2)(g), The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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mandatory by the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act and regulations 
promulgated thereunder that an array of records of essential documents must be kept 
by the commonhold association. They are: 
 
a. a register of members 
b. minutes of appointments of officers 
c. minutes of meetings 
d. copies of the original and any amended versions of the commonhold community 
statement 
e. accounting records 
f. insurance records 
g. register of tenants 
h. land registration documents 
 
General meetings of the members of the commonhold association 
Knowledge of the changing conditions of the commonhold is as important as records 
of documents in respect of prompt decision making. Access of knowledge of this kind 
requires what Ostrom (1990) observed as a drive towards batter common pool 
resources management, a medium for exchange of information among appropriators 
regarding aspects of the commons they have interests in. In the Commonhold scenario, 
general meetings give the members and directors of commonhold association 
opportunities to put forward and transact the business of the commonhold. The 
articles of association stipulates that the commonhold association must hold an annual 
general meeting62 and at least one additional general meeting known as ‘interim 
                                                 
62 Article 6, articles of association 
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general meetings’63. To facilitate communication of the issues within the commonhold, 
the articles of association also imposes a duty on the directors of the commonhold 
association to present an interim review of thee business and affairs of the 
commonhold association since the preceding annual general meeting alongside other 
matters put forward for resolution64. 
 
4.5 Operational level 
4.5.1 Boundaries 
A built environment in commonhold is quite different from the standard commons 
like water reserve or a wood in the sense that only areas defined as common parts fall 
within the scope of common pool resources. Significant portions of the commonhold 
are commonhold units held in private ownership by unit-holders. This stresses the 
necessity of unambiguous delineation of the boundaries between the two types of 
areas. 
 
The definition of boundaries is, together with other operational rules, made in the 
commonhold community statement of the commonhold association. 
 
The extent of common parts 
The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 gives a concise definition of the 
common parts of commonhold, which is every part of the commonhold not for the 
time being a commonhold unit. In light of this provision, the commonhold community 
statement contains no otiose provisions concerning the extent of common parts. 
 
                                                 
63 Article 7, articles of association 
64 Article 7, articles of association 
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Description of commonhold units 
As mentioned above, the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 relies very 
much on description of the commonhold units, made in the commonhold community 
statement, for a definition of the boundaries. The Act permits definition of the extent 
of a commonhold unit by: 
 
a. Referring to an area subject to the exclusion of specified structures, fittings, 
apparatus or appurtenances with the area65. By virtue of this provision, any pipes 
or conduits running through a commonhold unit may be excluded from the unit 
and retained by the commonhold association if it is so wished. 
b. Excluding the structures which delineate an area referred to66. Accordingly, it is 
possible, for instance, to exclude the external walls of a multi-storey building 
from the unit. 
c. Referring to two or more areas, whether or not contiguous67. It is thus possible 
for a unit to encompass, for example, a flat and a garage. 
 
Furthermore, to allow for pinpoint accuracy in defining the boundaries of the 
commonhold units, the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 requires, in 
addition to the description of the unit, its address, the commonhold number assigned 
and indications of parts to be excluded as stated above, a plan attached to the 
commonhold community statement showing each of the commonhold units. The plan 
must follow a set of requirements, which would ensure a high degree of accuracy. 
 
Limited use common parts 
                                                 
65 Section 11(3)(b), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
66 Section 11(3)(c), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
67 Section 11(3)(d), Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 
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In many buildings with communal facilities, certain areas of the common parts are not 
dedicated to general amenity. Some obvious examples of areas as such are: 
 
a. Ancillary space for plants and machinery, which may be the lift motor room in a 
multi-storey building or air-conditioner room in an office building. These areas 
are to be kept secure with access limited to authorized personnel. 
b. Storage or park spaces, which are to be let our to visitors and the like 
c. Garden area or turf which are provided for the aesthetics of the commonhold but 
restricted to the use of certain unit-holders. 
 
The commonhold community statement permits these kinds of bans and zoning of 
areas in which the bans take effects. It states that ‘limited use areas may only be used 
by authorized persons and in a manner consistent with the authorized use specified in 
Table 4 of Part II of this commonhold community statement.’68 
 
4.5.2 Appropriation rules 
In order to sustain a health commons, the draft prescribed form of the commonhold 
community statement provides a set of appropriation rule to regulate unit-holders’ 
behaviour in the day-to-day operation of the commonhold. Part III of the draft 
prescribed form contains a number of miscellaneous rules to control the use of both 
the common parts and units of the commonhold. The followings are barely a short 
abstract of the long list of provisions appearing in the original draft commonhold 
community statement. These items concern with areas where conflicts usually arise. 
 
i ). Access 
                                                 
68 Rule 10, commonhold community statement 
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No unit-holders or his invitees shall do any thing or leave or permit to be left any 
goods, rubbish or other object which obstructs or hinders lawful access to any 
part of the Commonhold. 
ii ). Aerials and satellite dishes 
No unit-holders or his invitees shall erect or permit to project outside his 
Commonhold Unit or into the Common Parts any radio or television aerial or 
satellite dish. 
iii ). Nuisance and annoyance 
A unit-holder must not, and must take reasonable steps to ensure that his invitees 
do not, behave in a way or create any sound or noise which causes or is likely to 
cause any annoyance, nuisance, injury or disturbance to other unit-holders, or to 
any other person lawfully on the commonhold, or to the occupiers of adjoining 
buildings or premises. 
iv ). Hazardous materials 
A unit-holder or his invitees may not, without the written consent of the Board of 
Directors, bring onto the commonhold or store in any part thereof, any 
flammable, hazardous or noxious substance. This does not apply to the storage of 
fuel in the fuel tank of a vehicle or in a small reserve tank for use in connection 
with the vehicle. 
v ). Pets 
No animals may be kept or brought onto the commonhold without the written 
consent of the Board of Directors 
 
Owing to the Department of Constitutional Affairs’ recognition of the freedom of 
commonhold associations to devise their own sets of rules fitting the commonhold 
situation, quite a lot of the less significant rules are dropped from the mandatory list 
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and turned optional. It is suggested that, as a matter of prudence, commonhold 
associations should enlist these provision in their commonhold community statement 
nonetheless, depending on the conditions and needs of the commonhold. 
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Chapter 5 
Implications 
 
5.1 Constitutional level 
As it was noted in the very beginning, the constitutional level rules of decision first 
come into existence as the foundation upon which the lower collective choice and 
operational rules are built. This implies the constitutional rules also limit the lower 
level rules to the scope of actions they permit. Within the ambit of the institution of 
Commonhold, the decision making rules exhibits a high degree of consistency of 
consistency between the levels. Further discussion below will come to similar 
conclusion. As a result of the high degree of consistency, the effect of the 
constitutional rules, whether positive or negative, will be at a state close to the fullest. 
 
As the three-level analysis of the decision making rules suggest, the UK government 
has been sustaining a seemingly unchallengeable constitutional background for the 
operation of Commonhold. The well-defined and protected individual rights, a high 
degree of autonomy of self-governing commonhold associations, high standard of rule 
of law upholding justice and fairness, all these make invaluable contribution to this 
cause, as does the sophisticated private property right system. However, in the course 
of defending the private property right of unit-holders as a freeholder of their units, 
which is a matter of constitutional choice, much hindrance surfaces at the lower 
decision making levels. The contradiction-free hierarchy and well-preserved private 
property right system have summed up to negative impact on the collective choice 
and operational levels in that a great deal of rights of enforcement and remedies are 
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scarified. 
 
Take maintenance and repair, an indispensable element of building management, as an 
example. In most institution relating to building co-ownership and management 
maintenance and repair are so crucial that the government will make express 
provisions imposing on certain party an obligation to keep the common parts and the 
units in good condition. For instance, the Hong Kong’s Building Management 
Ordinance stipulates that ‘the corporation shall maintain the common parts and the 
property of the corporation in a state of good and serviceable repair and clean 
condition’69; while the deed of mutual covenant will often include a clause requiring 
the owners to do something similar on his unit. In the Commonhold institution, 
Section 14(2) and 26(c) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 require 
the commonhold community statement to make provision regulating respectively the 
maintenance and repair of the commonhold units and the common parts. Included in 
the original draft of the commonhold community statement are a series of rules giving 
these effects: 
 
i ). Each unit-holder should be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the 
interior of his commonhold unit 
ii ). The commonhold association should be responsible for the repair and 
maintenance of the exterior of the commonhold units 
iii ). The commonhold association should repair and maintain the common parts. 
 
The following revised version of the document has seen significant departure from 
this maintenance framework. While the commonhold association is still given the 
                                                 
69 Section 18(1)(a) Building Management Ordinance 
 73
duty to maintain the common parts, the obligation for the owners to maintain and 
repair their units is dropped. This arrangement is explained in the Post-Consultation 
Report dated August 2003: 
 
‘Individual commonholds would be able to impose obligations on unit-holders to 
maintain their units if they so wish but we do not consider that a general mandatory 
obligation to keep a unit in good repair would be appropriate for a freehold owner, or 
necessary for a structurally independent unit. Similarly, an obligation to keep a unit 
clean does not seem to be appropriate to us. … It will bring commonhold obligations 
more in line with freehold expectations and will also have the advantage of 
minimizing the number of rights that are required over units or parts of units.’ 
 
This short abstract of the UK government’s view might sounds absurd were it not the 
consideration of freeholders’ right. 
 
Throughout the three levels of rules the government encountered plentiful temptation 
of better means of enforcement and remedies at the cost of violating or circumventing 
the private property right rules, yet unwaveringly it has resisted them all and 
repeatedly stressed its determination in blurring the line between freehold in 
commonhold units and the traditional freehold ownership. Nonetheless, there is no 
denying that the government’s adherence to the constitutional principle of protecting 
the freeholders’ rights has brought the Commonhold institution its batch of 
shortcomings and flaws. More on these happening at the collective choice and 
operation level are discussed below respectively. 
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5.2 Collective choice level 
When it comes to the collective choice level, the institution of Commonhold outright 
excels most non-statutory systems such as the common law co-ownership prevailing 
in Hong Kong. Under the current institutional setting in Hong Kong statutory 
intervention to prescribe officially recognized, self-governing incorporation of owners 
is non-existence. Establishment of self-governing bodies relies heavily on the deed of 
mutual covenant provisions, meaning the matter is left for the drafting party, usually 
the developer, to decide, or in quite some cases, to ignore. In such case where the 
deed of mutual covenant is silent on the matter, incorporation depends on initiative of 
the owners, who are in a position lack of coordination by a central authority, to 
convene a meeting and pass the related resolution. These arrangements, particularly 
the last, are dubious given that the primary objective justifying the self-governing 
organizations’ existence is to rectify the absence of central authority coordinating 
owners’ actions.  
 
In contrast, the self-governing commonhold association as a company limited by 
guarantee must be formally incorporated and registered to complete the process of 
adopting the Commonhold scheme. The formation procedures are clean and free from 
the complications haunting non-statutory systems. With clearly defined authority and 
scope of actions, the commonhold association effectively provides centralized 
enforcement against owners’ undesirable behaviours and redresses the problems of 
over-utilization of common parts and maximized the use of units as the cost of 
nuisance to others. On the other hand transaction costs shrink in the presence of 
centralized coordination, implying that unit-holders should find it less difficult to 
agree on joint payment for maintenance and the like. 
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In addition to formation of a self-governing organization, the preconditions for 
desirable common pool resource management demand a small group representing the 
all participants of collective choice decision making and a sound election mechanism 
to select the representatives. The first part is satisfied by appointment of the board of 
director of the commonhold association. Specifically, these representatives are given 
the duty to oversee the agent’s functioning, which they should never hesitate to fulfill 
considering that the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 unmistakably 
stipulates that directors’ delegation of their powers would not exempt their liabilities 
for non-performance of their duties. These arrangements, under which the individual 
owner principals, represented by the directors, will be united as a single entity in 
dealing with the managing agent and give only instructions out of coordinated 
decision among themselves, are the key to reverse the abnormal ‘powerful agent, 
weak individual principals’ relationship that has long been giving rise to excuse for 
managing agents not acting in the owners’ best interest. Moreover, the agent costs are 
minimized as a result. 
 
The selection criteria for this crucial representing group, albeit a product of careful 
deliberation, may attract criticism. While the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform 
Act 2002 prescribes that the membership should comprise unit-holders only save for 
the initial subscriber and / or developer, it does not prohibit non-members from taking 
up the post of directors as representatives of the members. Although this approach has 
the advantages that professionals, whose experience and expertise would help in 
running the commonhold, can be hired for the directors’ post, it has its major 
downsides which should not be underestimated. Above all, an additional layer of 
‘agency relationship’ is established. This agency relationship with a non-member 
director is different from one with a member director in that the divergence of a third 
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party agent (non-member director)’s own interest from the owner principals’ is far 
more significant compared with that in a scenario with a member being the director. 
Then there is the possibility that non-member directors, who are given the power to 
nominate new directors as member directors are, may collaborate to dominate the 
representing group, although the members retain the final right in passing the 
nomination resolution. These inadequacies may easily put the quality of 
representation and even the sovereignty of commonhold association members at risk. 
 
Currently it is provided that the board should include at least one member director. 
This prevention of total takeover can be lacking in commonhold with larger group of 
representatives. In view of the government intention that the quorum should increase 
with the membership, the minimum number of member should be modeled likewise. 
It will be of the unit-holders’ benefit to have the minimum set at 50 percent of the 
total size of the board. 
 
While the decision making mechanism is largely sound and successful in fulfilling the 
preconditions, it also has certain drawbacks. As the analysis reveals, decision making 
in the commonhold association features a ‘one vote per unit’ approach of vote 
allocation, yet by reason of procedural requirements the principle of ‘one vote per 
unit’ is not fairly realized in the default setting. Nonetheless, what actually sparks 
arguments is the potential unfairness which might emerge in certain scenarios under 
this prescribed approach of allocation of vote, even if the said inadequacies in 
implementing the ‘one vote per unit’ rule are responded with proper redress. The ‘one 
vote per unit’ prescription leading to unfairness is recognized in the Consultation 
Paper, as Paragraph 83 reads: 
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‘It may not … reflect the actual make-up of the commonhold. If we consider the 
example of a mixed-use commonhold, there may be one very large unit on the ground 
floor, perhaps a supermarket, above this there may be ten or more smaller residential 
units. It may create an unfair environment if the supermarket only exercises the same 
voting strength as each residential unit. On the other hand, if one person owns 
multiple units he or she may exercise the voting rights for every unit owned, which 
may effectively allow one person to dominate proceedings in the commonhold.’ 
 
Having perceived the potential unfairness the government has made the following 
mitigation proposals in the Consultation Paper: 
 
a. Allocation of voting rights by unit area or volume 
b. Allocation of voting rights by value of unit 
c. Restriction of voting by category of unit-holders, either residential or 
commercial, to matters relevant to and affecting the category of unit-holders 
concerned 
d. Prescription against excessive use of voting rights by a multiple unit-holder 
 
It is not difficult to conceive the complexity these alternatives would introduce and 
unfairness that may creep into the decision making mechanism somehow. For this 
reason the government has decided to adopt a solution explained by the Department 
of Constitutional Affairs in its Post-Consultation Report dated August 2003: 
 
‘In light of the wide range of views expressed by respondents we are now considering 
adopting a less prescriptive approach, using one member, one vote as a default 
provision but allowing commonhold associations the discretion to create their own 
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system of voting to reflect the circumstances of the individual commonhold. We 
anticipate that this would lead to some commonholds adopting alternative voting 
structures of the kinds detailed in the Consultation Paper. Other may use the 
distribution of units between properties as another way of achieving the required 
balance in voting rights.’ 
 
It is seen that although to certain extent uniformity is scarified, the flexible approach 
is realization of congruence between governing rules and local conditions, a common 
characteristic of long-enduring common pool resource institutions which Ostrom 
(1990) has turned into one of the design principles for common pool resource 
institutions. 
 
So far the institution of Commonhold has met every precondition for positive result of 
self-governance and sustainable use of common parts. However, there should be some 
reservation on this when it comes to sanction. The sanction system, or more precisely, 
the system of dispute resolution, virtually offers no real penalties for defaulting 
unit-holders. One subject of fierce debate during the passage of the Commonhold Bill 
was that the commonhold association lacks the much needed power of sanction. The 
unavailability of forfeiture as an effective means of sanction, being the weakest link in 
the system, faced wild attacks during the Committee Stage of the Commonhold Bill. 
A great number of speeches was given in support of allowing forfeiture as a remedy: 
 
‘It is not clear to me why there should be no power of forfeiture in the arrangements 
for managing commonhold properties. Surely the most effective sanction against a 
unit-holder failing to discharge his financial (or other) obligations to the association is 
to charge the unit as security for due performance. Unless the association has such 
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security, its only ultimate remedy is to prove in the defaulting unit-holder’s 
bankruptcy, in which it may recover only a small dividend.’70 
 
‘At present, where you have landlords and tenants, the former can use the threat of 
forfeiture. In practice, forfeiture is very rarely enforced because the landlord has to 
serve a notice calling for any defects to be remedied and give time for compliance 
under Section 146 of the Law of Property Act. Again, where the failure is in the 
payment of rent, similar provisions apply enabling a tenant to obtain relief, but such 
relief can only be obtained on payment on what is due. Therefore, that is a powerful 
and effective weapon. 
 
Of course, that weapon could be too effective. In the hands of aggressive landlords it 
can be used too soon, or too frequently, and can be a cause of serious concern to 
tenants who are faced with inappropriate us of forfeiture proceedings. Any equivalent 
in the case of a commonhold association is far less likely to happen because the 
association is also made up of the various members. They know that any threat that 
they use against a recalcitrant member of the association is one that can also be used 
against them. Quite frankly, abuse of any power equivalent to forfeiture in the case of 
a commonhold association is a very remote danger.’71 
 
In spite of all these endorsement, the government reaffirm its stand with the following 
condemnation of forfeiture as a remedy in commonhold: 
 
 ‘We remain firmly of the opinion that forfeiture, or any similar provision by 
                                                 
70 Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2001; col 499 
71 Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2001; col 505 
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whatever other name, is quite inappropriate for commonhold. … Behind every threat 
there must lie the possibility of action, and the possibility of a right to forfeiture being 
realized in the commonhold context remains for us anathema. 
 
We are apprehensive about importing a means of prematurely terminating a lease into 
commonhold because one of the fundamental precepts of commonhold is freehold 
ownership of units by unit-holders. We cannot conceive the merit of marrying 
together two concepts that are on the face of it so incompatible.’72 
 
‘A commonhold unit is a freehold estate in commonhold land. Forfeiture is a process 
used by the holder of a superior interest to prematurely terminate an inferior interest 
in his property. Termination of the interest by the holder of the superior interest occurs 
because of the failure of the holder of the inferior interest to fulfill an obligation owed 
to the holder of the superior interest. Such a relationship simply does not exist, and is 
not intended to exist, within commonhold. We are talking about unit-holders who 
have a parity of position without superiority or inferiority. There is no one with an 
interest in a commonhold unit superior to that of the unit-holder. The commonhold 
association is the registered proprietor of the freehold estate in the common parts but 
has no claim to the units, nor should it, we believe.’73 
 
It become apparent that forfeiture undermining the rights of unit-holders’ as 
freeholders is what ultimately worries the government. In effect, all this crossfire boils 
down to a single question: whether the expediency of introducing forfeiture as an 
effective remedy could outweigh the consistency of rule in the hierarchical decision 
                                                 
72 Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2001; col 508 
73 Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2001; col 509 
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making structure of the Commonhold institution. Obviously, as it was just explained 
in the above constitutional level section, the government’s answer is negative. Indeed 
this is yet another living proof of how some good-intended constitutional choice has 
unexpectedly cause hindrance to the lower level decision making. There cannot be too 
much restatement that the government’s strict adherence to the constitutional principle 
of protecting the freeholders’ rights is by no means inappropriate. What ought to be 
done to complement this systemic imperfection is balancing the outcomes, something 
for which the UK government has demonstrated its capability in this scenario. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the dispute resolution system has effectively given rise to 
a practice of minimizing reliance on external intervention (that of the court, for 
example). When private negotiation within the commonhold bears no fruits and the 
matters must be referred to an external authority for a judgment, the institution offers 
an easily accessible, inexpensive ombudsman scheme which not only plays a role 
similar to the court but also facilitate reconciliation in the process, essentially 
reducing the need for costly litigation. 
 
Finally, the precondition of access to relevant information is also met. With the 
commonhold association which itself boosts communication among members and 
prescribed general meetings as an ideal medium in which important matters are 
discussed among all members, information asymmetry can well be avoided. 
 
5.3 Operational level 
The two preconditions at operational level, definition of boundaries and congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, are fulfilled. Attached 
to the commonhold community statement is a plan that allow for pinpoint accuracy in 
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defining the boundaries of the commonhold units. Definition of common parts, which 
is the areas not defined as commonhold units, is clearly made accordingly. 
 
In contrast, the appropriation rules, or the ‘house rules’ governing operation of the 
commonhold were intentionally made less prescriptive by turning quite a number of 
the less significant rules optional. The recognition of the freedom of commonhold 
associations to devise their own sets of rules fitting the commonhold situation gives a 
sign of accomplishment of congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local conditions, attaining one of the seven leading design principles identified by 
Ostrom (1990), which, if all fulfilled, would bring about long-enduring common pool 
resources (in this case, common parts) governance. 
 
5.4 Consistency between levels of rules 
Evidenced by various cases discussed from all levels with the constitutional principle 
of freehold ownership safeguarded at the sacrifice of unavailability of sanction by 
forfeiture at the collective choice level as the most prominent representative, the 
institution of Commonhold exhibits a high degree of consistency in the hierarchical 
decision making structure. This accounts for numerous scholars’ call for a statutory 
system like Commonhold (Walters and Kent, 2000) to replace the non-statutory 
common law co-ownership system in Hong Kong, the decision making hierarchy of 
the latter being a mess according to Walters and Kent’s (2000) conclusion from the 
case of Grace International Ltd. v. Incorporated owners of Fontana Gardens & Ors 
[1996] 4HKC 635 (HC). 
 
The high degree of consistency has endowed the Commonhold institution with an 
advantage that when problems strike, the source of the problems can be identified at 
 83
ease. There is no worry about the complication of problems hidden under complex 
conflicts of rules of different levels like in the Fontana Gardens case ‘failure of the 
collective choice level also leads to a failure to enforce operational level rules’ 
(Walters and Kent, 2000). The unambiguous, confusion-free decision making 
mechanism, while partly attributable to the carefully drafted prescribed forms of 
documents, should also be accredited to the consistent framework. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
Meeting a great majority of Wang’s preconditions which incorporate Ostrom’s (1990) 
design principles for long-enduring common pool resource governance, the institution 
of commonhold should, according to Ostrom (1990), have a very positive result and 
achieve sustainable development of common pool resources (the common parts, in the 
case of building management). Moreover, it is shown that the institution is effective in 
preventing problems of poor management that would commonly arise in non-statutory 
co-ownership system like Hong Kong’s. 
 
However, the institution of Commonhold has its batch of shortcomings and flaws. 
What might not have not been explicitly given consideration by certain advocators, as 
various examples in the three-level analysis has suggested, is that even thought a high 
degree of consistency in the hierarchical structure of decision making is maintained, 
there are chances that constitutional or collective choice out of good intention can 
result in hindrance in decision making in lower levels. In these cases, rigid adherence 
is by no means the proper solution. Rather, the systemic imperfection necessitates 
complements of sensible judgment and balance of outcomes. 
 
Overall, judging from the decision making aspect, Commonhold is a structurally and 
elementally sound institution, yet definitely it is never a panacea for all inadequacies 
in management of multi-storey buildings and developments of other kinds in common 
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ownership. As Walters and Kent (2000) suggest, ‘like strata title systems in other 
jurisdictions, it [Commonhold] would establish a new form of relationship between 
co-owners and managers that could have a significant effect upon transaction costs 
associated with community living’. 
 
6.2 Limitation of the study 
In addition to physical assets and decision making arrangements, Oakerson’s (1990) 
framework entails a third element leading to the outcome, patterns of interaction. 
While the study has shown that physical assets are unlikely to experience drastic 
change of any kind which justified its focus on decision making arrangements only, 
patterns of interaction between rules and physical assets which might be as detailed as 
how house rules are defined in different commonholds, is excluded from the scope of 
the study. This accounts for the comparably brief operational level discussion in the 
study. 
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